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EU’s Normative Actorness in Ukraine 
- A Case Study of the Ukrainian Crisis 2014 
 
Problem formulation: Has the EU’s global actorness as a normative power exhibited 
a gap between expectations and capabilities in the case study of the Ukrainian crisis? 
 
                                                                                           “The Treaty on European Union obliges the EU to uphold 
                                                                                          and promote its values and   to contribute to the protection                              
                                                                                                 of human rights in its relations with the wider world.” 
                                                                                                     - The Treaty of The European Union, TEU, 1993 
 
 
 
Abstract: This project examines from a constructivist perspective the role of the EU 
in global politics, with a specific case study of the current Ukrainian crisis. There has 
been quite a lot of debate recently, concerning whether or not the EU’s actions in this 
conflict have been sufficient or to limited. This is in our perspective a highly topical 
debate with multiple actors, and thus we decided to investigate if there is a gap 
between EU’s expectations and capabilities in relation to its current global actorness. 
We adopted a constructivist approach that helped us define the EU’s actorness and 
give special attention to the ideas and arguments attached to its actions in Ukrainian. 
Furthermore we utilized Bretherton & Vogler’s conception of actorness 
complemented with theories - respectively, C. Hills Capability-Expectations Gap and 
I. Manners Normative Power Europe, which provided us with a strong analytical 
foundation. The project will thus provide differing theoretical approaches to the 
complex actorness of the EU in a specific conflict setting. We analyze if previous 
actions by the EU in global settings has constructed excessive foreign policy 
expectations that may not correlate with its actual capabilities. This project will 
demonstrate and discuss the implications and benefits of normative power and outline 
the size of a potential gap between capabilities and expectations in the EU.  
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1. Problem Area: 
 
On November 21, 2013 Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych abandons the 
economic and political “Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement” under 
Russian pressure. This triggers violent occupations of buildings and protests in the 
capital of Kiev where clashes between parliament and opposition escalate. 
Immediately following the riots, pro-Russian troops occupy key buildings in the 
capital of the Ukrainian independent peninsula Crimea, Simferopol. Crimea is under 
the Russian annexation faced with a dilemma of choosing which affiliation is more 
appealing; the Ukrainian/European or Russian. The United Nations General Assembly 
confirms on March 27, 2014 that the annexation of Crimea is a fundamental breach of 
international law. Putin declares that Russia’s actions in the event is based on the 
grounds of an ideology that emphasizes the protection of Russian interests outside 
Russia (Rosa Balfour, 2014, p. 1). The same goes for the EU that have previously 
declared through the TEU to uphold and promote its values in its relations with the 
wider world. This will underline how the EU as a complex entity faces paradoxes 
grounded in its normative or civilian foreign policies.  
 
2. Introduction:  
 
The case of Ukraine was selected as a case study in order to investigate EU actorness 
in its neighboring countries. This case will through a range of selected theories 
conceptualize EU as a global actor with Bretherton & Vogler’s Actorness approach, 
Ian Manners Normative Power Europe theory and Cristopher Hill’s Capability-
Expectations Gap Theory. We do from the very beginning perceive EU as a normative 
power. This relies heavily on Bretherton & Vogler’s approach to EU actorness and 
Normative Power Europe. The case study of Ukraine is however from our point of 
view a very complex case in which we expect normative power to be only one of 
many explanatory factors for EU’s actions and identity as a global actor. Therefore we 
also acknowledge that the Actorness approach is not a sufficient tool and requires a 
more critical selection of theories, which can account for EU’s presence and 
capabilities in relation to the Ukrainian crisis. With the perception of EU as a 
normative power we will include and analyze the case with the Capability-
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Expectations gap where the concepts of the theory is reinterpreted in order to fit our 
constructivist framework. This theory sets out a foundation for us to divide EU 
actorness into different conceptualizing sections. These sections will be applied 
directly to the case study of EU as an actor in Ukraine and will form a bridge leading 
to Ian Manners’ Normative Power Europe Theory, which will deepen the discussion 
of EU’s normative power. The test of the EU’s actorness in its neighboring countries 
concluded from this case study will finally bring us back to the starting point, being 
the concept of actorness. We will thus outline the capabilities and expectations of EU 
in Ukraine and clarify the gap between them. Furthermore we will conclude on EU 
actorness in Ukraine and discuss the theoretical implications of defining EU actorness 
including limits of normative power. Our conclusion will then outline the debate over 
EU actorness and through theoretical processing argue if the EU has acted adequately 
in relation to its normative power and the expectations deducted therefrom. 
The project will begin with a literature review where we will clarify our own 
perception of EU as a normative power through ”The Construction of a Normative 
Power” by M. Pace and Bretherton & Vogler’s concept of actorness. This will as 
previously mentioned be our starting point. The section furthermore include a 
literature review of C. Hill’s Capability-Expectations Gap and I. Manner’s Normative 
Power Europe, why we include these to our analysis and why Bretherton & Vogler’s 
theory of actorness is not a sufficient analytical tool. The following section is a 
theoretical section describing actorness, the Capability-Expectations Gap and 
Normative Power Europe more specifically in connection to the problem area. When 
the theories core compenents have been described we can move on to the 
analytical/reflexive section which will utilize our findings in a reflexive manner that 
considers EU’s actorness in our case study. Connectingly the next section is a 
methodological section describing our constructivist approach to actorness and the 
general methodology of the project. The succeeding section contains a background for 
the crisis and the connection to our study. In this section there will also be a 
description of EU’s relation to Russia and Ukraine, hereunder the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. This will lead to and equip us with sufficient tools to analyze, 
discuss and conclude on our case 
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3.	  Approach	  and	  literature/theoretical	  review:	  
	  
Before we present Bretherton & Vogler’s approach to actorness we will first include 
our own conception of normative actorness which can best be outline through ”The 
Construction of EU Normative Power” by Michelle Pace. The paper presents the 
same line of argument that we approach the case study with and wish to reflect on 
through a set of theories: Namely that the nature of EU’s normative power 
disempowers its global political role in some instances. We do not see EU’s 
normative identity as a negative attribute but do acknowledge its limits and flaws in 
conflict resolution (M. Pace, 2007, p. 1041-1042) A limitations with which we 
especially agree is normative powers’ creation of “a gap between the rhetoric of 
international law and the actual situation on the ground in conflict situations” (M. 
Pace, 2007, p. 1056). This leads us to an assumption of EU actorness, which is very 
grounded in opportunity in the external environment. Opportunity is one of 3 factors 
that shape EU’s external activities, the other 2 being presence and capability 
according to Bretherton & Vogler (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 24). Based on 
our initial conception we will use this approach. The approach will be explained more 
in-depth in the theory section but the main arguments is presented here. 
”Opportunity” means the structural context of action in an environment that either 
allows or constrains the actorness of the EU. In the Ukrainian crisis there are both 
ideas and events the calls for EU actorness but also some which restrains it. 
”Presence” means the ability to exert influence externally; to shape the perceptions, 
expectations and behavior of others. It includes that reputation and ideas attributed to 
the EU externally. ”Capability” concerns EU’s policy coherence and ability to 
formulate effective policies and also the availability of policy instruments. 
 
We see all three notions of actorness to provide an insight for analysis in our case 
study. It was though also clear that as ”presence” shares many aspects with the 
”expectations”-part of Hill’s Capability-Expectations-Gap theory that this theory 
would provide us further analytical tools. Furthermore Bretherton & Vogler’s 
definition of ”capabilities” do also share some elements of Hill’s definition of 
capabilities. Hill’s definition is though split more broadly into clear categories 
explained in the theory section. The complex case of Ukraine, we argue, calls for a 
	   7	  
broader set of theories which provides different insights to EU actorness. Capability 
as explained by Bretherton & Vogler differs from Hill’s in the way that Hill draws on 
some realist power assumption. We though adopt Bretherton & Vogler’s approach 
that material conditions of EU policy and quantitative do to some degree matter but it 
is the meanings attached to these conditions that is of greatest importance (C. 
Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 24).  
 
Importance of normative power can be extracted from both Bretherton & Vogler and 
Hill’s theory. As our project evolves around the concept of normative power and its 
implication of in connection to EU’s opportunity, presence and capability it is though 
also necessary to include Manner’s Normative Power Europe Theory more broadly 
conceptualize EU’s normative power and connect that to our theoretical framework. 
 
Much of our empirical material on EU actorness, institutions, treaties etc. is 
furthermore sources from Bretherton & Vogler’s “the European Union as a Global 
Actor” from 2006. 
4. Theories and approaches: 
 
4.1. Actorness 
 
Actorness can briefly be defined as an entity that is capable of agency; of formulating 
and acting upon decisions. It is though argued that agency is not unlimited, as it is 
considered that the capacity to act reflects interactions between understandings on the 
internal character and capabilities, and external opportunities (J. Vogler & C. 
Bretherton, 2006, p. 35). 
Vogler & Bretherton furthermore argues that EU is an actor under construction, which 
seem reasonable, as it is not yet defined how many member states that are allowed to 
join. But the notions of opportunity, presence and capability can help conceptualizing 
the actorness of the European Union. 
 
The concept of “actorness” is in this project an approach to conceptualize EU as a 
global actor. Where the following two theories described in the next subsections are 
used predictively to analyze the EU, “actorness” will serve to build a conceptual 
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foundation (opportunity, presence & capability) on which we can place our 
theoretical/analytical findings in order to conceptualize actorness. “Actorness” is thus 
simply an approach for us to grasp the complexity of EU foreign policy.  
 
4.2. Theorizing the Capability-Expectations Gap 
 
The Capability-Expectations Gap (CEG) was first presented in the Journal of 
Common Market Studies (JCMS) under Cristopher Hill’s influential article ”The 
Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”. It 
makes the central claim that the proclamations of EU’s capabilities has been inflated 
to the point where a remarkable gap between capabilities and expectations exists. The 
approach explicitly builds upon realist actor assumptions as Hill cautions against high 
expectations of the European Community as an international actor. EU’s reshaping of 
the international system is greatly reduced by the uneven distribution of military 
forces and, in realist assumption that the basis power in the international system 
belongs to state. The aim of the approach is on these premises to conceptualize EU’s 
international role by contrasting third party perceptions and expectations to the 
fulfilments and capabilities of the EU. (C. Hill, 1993, p.  306) The general argument 
presented by authors affiliated with the CEG is that European foreign policy, rather 
than simply stating potential and aspirations, must also demonstrate these through 
action. The EU will therefore need credible capabilities. “It is not sufficient to simply 
amass the power tools: the political unit must also possess the institutions to mobilize 
them and the decision- making mechanisms to command them” (A. Toje, 2008, p. 
123). 
 
It is important to underline that CEG is not in itself a theory. It is intentionally pre-
theoretical as it solely creates general ideas and arguments and conceptualizes EU as 
foreign policy actor and patterns of EU activity (R. H. Ginsberg, 1999, p. 4; C. Hill, 
1998, p. 9; A. Toje, 2008, p. 123). It is thus not created as a prediction framework. In 
this project it will though be used as the primary theoretical foundation and the 
theory’s counterparts, namely, “the ability to agree”, “resource allocation” and “the 
instruments at the EU’s disposal” will be our theoretical starting point in our research 
(C. Hill, 1993: 315). These counterparts are once again divided on 6 capabilities 
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explained below. It will be predictional or theoretical in the way that foresees a 
certain gap between EU capabilities and expectations in the Ukrainian conflict on the 
foundation of the specific set of three primary components along with the definitions 
of ”capability” and ”expectation”. We will furthermore argue for the approach as a 
theory as it can be regarded as an application of David Easton’s systems theory to EU 
foreign policy (C. Hill, 1998, p. 9; R. H. Ginsberg, 1999, p. 5; See Figure 1 in 
appendix). Hill concludes on this issue in the 1997 revision of GEP that it can indeed 
be utilized as a theory which R. H. Ginsberg further describes as a tool to categorize 
and test the utility of various explanatory concepts along the decision-making 
continuum (R. H. Ginsberg, 1999, p. 6). CEG as a sub theory will thus examine the 
CFSP as a sub-system of the international system wherein internal dynamics, 
decisions and actions are influenced by and analyzed in connection to external 
influence in the form of demands, support and expectations (C. Hill, 1998, p. 9; D. 
Easton, 1965, p. 32). EU’s framework (the capabilities) as an analytical subject is 
thereby analyzed according to the environment/system (expectations) in which it 
exists. 
 
The subordinate parts of the theory – ”capability” and ”expectation” must first be 
briefly elaborated on. We have organized the instruments/definitions for 
comprehensible convenience and future analytical elaboration. Both capabilities and 
expectations are historical and thereby not static and subject to change over time. 
 
Capability: Capabilities accounts for traditional foreign policy instruments. These are 
as presented by Hill: 
 
1) The use and threat of force 
2) Diplomacy 
3) Economic carrots and sticks 
4) Cultural influence (normative power) 
5) Resources (population, wealth, technology, human capital and political stability) 
6) cohesiveness (capacity to reach and implement a collective decision) 
(C. Hill, 1998, p. 8) 
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Expectations : Expectations accounts for both internal, and in this context, most 
importantly, external ambitions or demands of EU’s international behavior (C. Hill, 
1998, p. 8). These are as presented by Hill: 
 
1) Political pressures to grant membership of the EU to supplicant states 
2) Provide solutions to the problems of third countries 
3) Pressures for economic assistance, in the form of aid, trade preferences or even 
access to the Single Market 
4) Intellectual expectations that the EU can resolve the problem of the nation-state, 
provide a new framework for European order or an alternative identity for the non-
American West (C. Hill, 1998, p. 8). 
 
4.2.1. Constructivist methodological and theoretical reflections of the CEG:  
 
While the Normative Power Europe theory conceptually and methodologically aligns 
with our constructivist approach to conceptualize EU as a global actor, The 
Capability-Expectations Gap theory at first glance does not. The theory includes six 
parameters of EU capability, from which diplomacy, cultural influence and 
cohesiveness fits into the analytical and explanatory framework of constructivism, 
where meanings and ideas are constructed through the interaction between actors. The 
conventional instruments of threat and force, economic carrots and sticks, and 
resources are however strengthening an approach to view the state as the basis of 
power and interest in the international system. This makes the theory ontologically 
diverse and requires a methodological management of the ”Capability-Expectations 
Gap” which cooperates with our constructivist approach. Hill disclaims any 
ontological belonging of the approach as its counterparts goes some way in both 
reinforcing realist and idealist assertions, as accounted for above (C. Hill, 1993, p. 
306). We will therefore briefly explain how we have utilized the theory from a 
constructivist perspective. 
 
From a constructivist ontology we interpret the specific object or structures, being EU 
capabilities, inseparable and highly interconnected to its actors. A material reality 
thereby exist, despite the idealist line of reasoning, but it is ultimately dependent on 
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the meanings attached to it. It is thereby not the quantitative material reality which is 
the center of research but rather the qualitative meanings and ideas prescribed to it (V. 
Pouliot, 2007, p. 360; M. Zehfuss, 2002, p. 4). The material reality is thus not a causal 
variable, but simply a sphere of interpretation from which the interpretation is 
determining its outcomes. When we in this project through constructivism analyze 
”material” instruments e.g. military capability we are not examining its quantity or 
material deployment but the meaning contributed to it through its internal and external 
interaction, being respectively member state bargaining and external affairs. The same 
perspective goes for the more the more constructivist convenient instruments of 
diplomacy, cultural influence and cohesiveness. The consciousness of the material 
ontology alongside the ideational allows us to grasp the full range of instruments for 
analysis and utilize the theory as intended. Most importantly and cooperating with our 
theoretical material it means that our analysis will have a focus on the constructed 
expectations of EU In the Crimea and how EU has acted according to these by 
looking at its capabilities 
 
4.2.2: Critique of Capability-Expectations Gap 
First, we find it reasonable to associate a critique of the specific approach we have 
had to CEG. As mentioned, it does rely on some realist state assumption, from which 
especially the parts “the use of threat of force/military” and “resources” are not 
suitable as quantitative capability measurements under a constructivist framework and 
with the NPE. We have therefore allocated focus away from resources and utilized 
“the use of threat and force” to include strictly “civilian means”. This should not be 
interpreted as a rewriting of the original theory but merely our epistemological 
interpretation of the means by which to conceptualize actorness. Another critique lies 
in rise and lowering of expectations it has for EU when they either fail or succeed in 
upholding internal and external expectations as the theory is conceptualizing and 
thereby simplifies a very complex actor (A. Toje, 2008, p. 139). This will be further 
elaborated on in our analysis/reflections 
4.3. Normative Power Europe  
 
Professor Ian Manners coined the term ‘Normative Power Europe’ in 2002.  The term 
was meant as a tool for conceptualizing the EU as an actor in global politics, and 
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explaining its behavior. Furthermore it illustrated a somewhat controversial line of 
reasoning that differed from the then dominant notions of power politics. Notions of 
‘Civilian Power’ or ‘Military Power’ were reevaluated by Manners. Ian Manners 
argued that the EU represents neither a civilian power of an intergovernmental nature 
utilizing economic tools, nor a military power of supranational nature using armed 
force, but is indeed a normative power of an ideational nature characterized by 
common principles (I. Manners, 2002, p. 238). At this point it is important for us to 
mention, that we have adopted the view of Ian Manners and approach our empirical 
material with the preconceived belief that the EU is indeed a normative power in 
global politics. We will use this approach to analyze how a normative power like the 
EU acts in global politics, and how the internal/external capabilities – expectations are 
diffused and experienced by third countries with a focus on the current Crimea crisis. 
With the use of this thesis combined with analyzing a potential gap between 
expectations and capabilities of the EU in relation to the crisis. We will expect to 
reach our goal of proposing if the EU global actorness as a normative power 
correlates with the preconceived expectations – capabilities that exist.  
In the following section we will account for Manners concept ‘normative power 
Europe - NPE’, thus basically also accounting for our perception of the EU in global 
politics, since we have adopted his view.   
Manners proposes, that we should reconsider both notions of military and civilian 
instruments to evaluate EU’s normative power in world politics (I. Manners, 2002, 
236)  
He also includes the Capability-Expectations Gap to underline the changing 
expectations of the EU global actorness in connection to its failure to meet its foreign 
policy and military goals, and furthermore argues that expectations and global 
discourse has changed the notion of power from actual quantitative capabilities to the 
power of ideas and norms following the end of the cold war. This does by R. 
Rosecrance’s definition mean a discourse from quantitative to qualitative 
measurements (I. Manners, 2002, p.237-238). 
 
We will go some way in reinforcing the notion of EU as primarily a normative actor. 
“Conceptions of EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in 
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discussions of capabilities, need to be explained with a focus on normative power of 
an ideational nature.” (I. Manners, 2002, p. 239) 
 
Manners argues that the promotion of the EU‟s principles is most effective through 
engagement and dialogue, which can be found in regular patterns of communication 
with third partners, including “thorough accession procedures, stabilization and/or 
association agreements, e.g. the ‘European Neighborhood Policy’ (I. Manners, 2009, 
p.3).  
 
As noted in the TEU (Treaty on the European Union) the EU’s external relations, 
have become conditional on a variety of norms more or less equivalent to the 
European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR) and the 
universal declaration of human rights (UDHR).  
 
“The EU is founded on and has as its foreign and development policy objectives the 
consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (Treaty of the European Union, 1993 art. 6, art. 11)   
   
Manner suggests through the concept of NPE that not only is the EU constructed on a 
normative basis but, that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world 
politics. It is built on the crucial observation that the most important factor shaping 
the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is (I. 
Manners, 2002, p. 252). Manner elaborates this view by stating;  
“Thus, my presentation of the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to 
it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international 
system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the 
international system; and a normative quality to it - that the EU should act to extend 
its norms into the international system” (I. Manners, 2002, p. 252)   
         
Ian Manner refers to and cites sociologist and proponent of several conflict resolution 
theories Johan Galtung when he says that the “ideological power is the power of 
ideas” (J. Galtung, 1973, p. 33). He continues by arguing that ideological power is 
powerful because the power-sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-
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recipient. Manners broadly agrees with this assumption, he elaborates on the term 
“power of ideas” by indicating that the ultimate power is to shape the will of others 
without the use of force. This issue will be further elaborated on in our analysis 
section, is the power of ideas sufficient in global politics and is there a gap between 
the expectations – capabilities of the EU globally in general and in relation to the 
current crisis.   
 
The principles of democracy, international law, social justice and respect for human 
rights that Manners believe characterize the EU and its normative power was made 
explicit in 1973 in the Copenhagen declaration on European identity. In addition to 
human rights incorporation into its official discourse and legislation, the EU argues 
that it seeks to promote similar values in its external actions (G. Crawford 2002, 911). 
These officially stated principles are of high value in relation to analyzing the actions 
taken by the EU in the current Crimea crisis. Manner argues that the EU has a high 
commitment to the preservation of human rights and international law, and by such 
must be somewhat obliged to intervene in this Crisis since most nations perceives the 
Russian annexation of Crimea as a breach of international law (I. Manners, 2002, p. 
244). In the current crisis respectively, Russia and the Ukrainian government have 
violated several of the European core principles. Questions naturally arises 
concerning to what extent the EU should get involved as well as how it should 
exercise its power. We believe that in order to maintain its reputation as a global 
peacemaking actor, the EU will have to act when clear violations of their main 
principles are conducted in their own backyard, but still the questions remain. Even 
though we have adopted the view of Ian Manners and the EU as a normative power 
and furthermore approach our material from a constructivist methodologically we also 
acknowledge that military forces and economic sanctions are of significance in the 
current crisis.  Reinforcing our previous statement it can be summarized that 
“Intersubjective systemic structures consist of shared understandings, expectations 
and social knowledge embedded in international institutions… Intersubjective 
structures give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors 
act” (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 21) 
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4.3.1. Normative power definition: 
 
The definition of the EU as a normative power presented by Ian Manners are decisive 
for how we conceptualize the term. The EU’s international actions are described as 
the exercise of normative power reflected in its use of persuasion, argumentation, and 
deliberation based on norms, which others recognize have greater validity than 
beyond national interest (Link 2)  
Manners defines a normative power as being able to exercise power over interests e.g. 
the ability to get what you want without coercion or force , thus changing the 
foundation for distinct conceptions of what constitute norms in foreign societies. 
Normative power is based upon the power to negotiate, persuade and cooperate (I. 
Manners, 2002, p. 241). Furthermore, he argues that a normative power status is 
rooted in the power of ideas and norms, the act of being attractive and cooperative. 
The core principles constituting normative power in the case of the EU is from his 
perspective its ability to diffuse democracy, good governance, social justice, human 
rights etc. without using the threat of force (Link 2).   
 
4.3.2. Critique of Normative Power Europe 
 
 
Manners distinguish himself from critics of the term European normative power such 
as Hedley Bull and Kenneth Waltz, who inter alia stresses that without material force 
and willingness to use it the EU is unlikely to become an important international actor 
setting the agenda in areas of politics and economics.  The liberal-idealist approach of 
Manners to the concept of power has thus been widely criticized among proponents of 
different ideologies and especially from the neo-realists branch of theorists.  
Hedley Bull (The English School) argued that without the sufficient military power 
the EU will not be an effective player in international affairs, and elaborated on this 
line of thought by stating,  
“Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become 
one” (H. Bull, 1982, p. 151).  
Kenneth Waltz critiques such approaches to concepts of normative power stating that 
they are reductionist because they try to explain international outcomes through 
elements and combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels and 
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they tend to neglect the power of force, which have been dominant in international 
power politics for decades (K. Waltz, 1979, p. 60). As an analytical vanishing point, it 
is argued that the normative power approach has its limitations, since it tends to focus 
solely on ideas, norms, values, interaction etc. and neglects e.g. military force.     
There are thus various different ideological critiques to the concept of normative 
power and its proponents.  
There is a general assumption among neo –realists that such concepts does not apply 
in what they perceive as an anarchical world order, where nations are subdued to 
structures that confine them to act or behave in certain ways. 
The critique from the English School of thought lies in the belief that without a 
substantial instrument of force/coercion a real international power will not be able to 
emerge. Why should foreign nations adapt to the EU’s policies, norms and values 
when they have no way of reinsuring security e.g. in times of war. K. Waltz, 1979, p. 
60-70) 
 
5. Methods: 
 
This section aims to provide the reader with an overview of our methodological 
considerations. We will introduce our choice of method and present arguments as to 
why we choose this specific approach. Furthermore, we will argue for why we have 
chosen to conduct a qualitative research and for having incorporated a deductive 
approach line of reasoning. 
 
We will approach our area of research from a social constructivist manner. We will 
engage in a topical issue that invites to discussion of the EU's responsibility and 
capability in international affairs, and how self-image and expectations/perceptions 
are socially constructed and might influence or affect the current responsibility and 
capability of the EU. The social constructivist approach will help us clarify how ideas 
and norms embedded within EU external policies have been constructed through 
various opposing ideas and evolved with the changing contours of the international 
sphere. It will thus enable us to engage in a discussion about how the foundation of a 
normative power like the EU is contested in times of crisis like the current one in 
Crimea. Constructivists tends to emphasize the importance of culture and identity as 
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expressed in social norms, rules, and understandings. The social and political world is 
made up of shared beliefs rather than physical entities (R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, 
2012, p. 224). 
Social constructivism within international relations is primarily concerned with the 
fact that structures are created through interaction and the act of sharing 
ideas/knowledge within and across communities and not by material forces, which is 
the case for realists.  Since international structures are built on shared ideas and 
knowledge, it will always be possible to change these structures. Identities and 
interests are thus dynamic and constructed through interaction rather than embedded 
in the human nature. European cooperation have been a central theme in constructivist 
analyses. While a realist might say that European foreign policies is simply a product 
of the interests of each individual nation, and close cooperation will never emerge due 
to diverging interests. A constructivist would argue that interests are created through 
social interaction (K.Glarbo, 1999, p. 634.637). 
 
“The results of national diplomacies intentionally and unintentionally communicating 
to themselves and to each other their intents and perceptions of political co-operation” 
(K. Glarbo, 1999, p. 637).  
Constructivists are thus, content that political co-operation will eventually promote a 
shaping of common perspectives and coordination. This approach will be apparent in 
our analyses of the EU –Russian - Ukrainian relationship and the actions taken by the 
EU in relation to exercise its normative power and support Ukraine during the current 
Crimea crises. We will try to highlight if there might be any inconsistencies in the 
exercise of European foreign policies in relation to its expectations/capabilities.  
      
Social constructivists furthermore, argue that individuals and their social reality are 
interconnected. There is no fixed social reality but the one we construct for ourselves 
through interactions. Individual actions, choices and conceptions of the world are 
constructed through earlier experiences. As social beings (actors), we are part of a 
community (agent), which affects us and eventually helps shape and define our social 
identities. Our social identities will then have an impact on that society, thus actors 
and agents are mutually affecting each other (R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, 2012, p. 
224). In relation to our aim of investigating the EU's responsibilities and capabilities 
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in relation to exercise its normative power, this aspect of constructivism becomes 
quite vital.  
 
Martha Finnemore, (National Interests in International Society, 1996) a major 
advocate of the field of constructivism, proposed a peculiar systemic analysis of how 
nation-states are influenced by norms within the international society. The norms of 
international society are transmitted to states through international organizations. 
They shape national policies by ‘teaching’ states what their interests should be (R. 
Jackson and G. Sørensen, 2012, p. 218).   
Social constructivism assumes that the world system is dynamic and structures 
change. As events occur and affect our environments, our perceptions of reality are 
affected and our subsequent actions will be adapted to those perceptions, meaning that 
events such as the annexation of Crimea presents a chance for the EU to reinforce its 
legitimacy as a normative power through the act of e.g. diplomacy, and thus have an 
impact on the bodies involved, and their following actions. The actions taken by the 
EU in the Crimea conflict will thus be of great importance, in relation to Europeans’ 
perception of themselves in current time and the time to follow. Furthermore, the 
external perceptions of the EU will change and adapt in connection with these actions.  
 
Social constructivism can contribute to an enhanced understanding of the EU’s 
foreign policies by providing a broader analytical tool in relation to examine concepts 
such as normative power which includes elements of multilateralism, democracy, 
equality, human rights, development and social justice in relation to the interaction 
between nation-states on an intergovernmental level (I. Manners, 2009, p. 5)  “…a 
constructivist perspective will complement… our theoretical approaches by 
emphasizing that the interests of actors cannot be treated as exogenously given or 
inferred from a given material structure. Rather, political culture, discourse, and the 
‘social construction’ of interests and preferences matter” (T. Risse, 2004, p. 161). 
Constructivist analyses focus on structures as intersubjective and not material as neo-
realist would argue, and because understandings of the EU, its roles, responsibilities 
and limitations to some extend form the intersubjective international structures that 
provide the ‘action settings’ of global politics we find the approach highly appropriate 
in the mediating dialogue in Crimea (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler p 23). It is also our 
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belief that the EU actorness contributes to the construction of international structures, 
through its normative presence, which we will further investigate in the case study.      
 
Conclusively we agreed on taking a social constructivist stance since we believe it 
provides a good framework for explaining how the EU’s decision making process in 
the current Crimea crisis will affect and shape its identity in global politics. 
Furthermore, it will be a helpful analytical tool in relation to arguing if the EU’s 
efforts to help Ukraine are consistent with its reputation as a normative power with 
core principles such as human rights, international law etc. By approaching our area 
of research from this angle, we will be able to suggest if the EU’s external 
expectations match its capabilities. And investigate how the EU actorness has evolved 
and changed international settings e.g. as Keohane and Hoffmann proposed in 1991 
that the EU is “essentially organized as a network that involves the pooling or sharing 
of sovereignty” (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, p 22).     
 
We will now briefly account for the ontology (nature of being) of social 
constructivism in order to clarify why we place such focus on normative power and 
ideas as well as sharing our own subjective beliefs. It is based on the belief that the 
social and political world is not a physical entity or material object that is outside 
human consciousness. There is no objective or external social reality to the observer. 
The international system exists only as an intersubjective awareness among people, 
meaning, that ideas and not material forces create the system. The system individuals 
operate within is based on purely intellectual and ideational ever-changing ideas, thus 
reality is constructed and there exists no universal truths. It is a system of norms, 
which has been created by certain people at a particular time and place. (R. Jackson 
and G. Sørensen, 2012, p. 209)  
 
The epistemology of social constructivism is transactional/subjective. The goal is to 
understand multiple realities, and dynamic changes. Humans generate knowledge 
(epistemology) from interaction. Furthermore, all actors and agents in 
national/international settings learn from previous experiences, thus adapting and 
developing on several levels.  
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We have chosen to combine deductive reasoning with our qualitative research, 
because that combination was the best solution in order for us to answer our problem 
formulation. 
Deductive reasoning takes a starting point in generalizations, and proceeds to see if 
these generalizations can be applied in specific instances (Link 6). In our case, these 
generalizations will be resembled in our data about the European Union and the 
Crimea crisis. We will work qualitatively with this data and commence with an 
analysis, which will address a specific instance. We believe that the adoption of 
deductive reasoning will represent an important step in connection to ‘verifying’ our 
qualitative research findings. 
 
6. Empirical section/ background:  
 
6.1. Background to the Crimean Crisis 
 
The crisis in Ukraine, concerning the Crimean peninsula, started as an aftermath of 
the Ukrainian revolution, where the now former president, Viktor Yanukovych, 
needed to flee to capital of Ukraine, Kiev. This happened in the late February 2014. 
One week after this revolution, pro-Russian forces gradually started to intervene, and 
take control over the former Russian peninsula, Crimea. Through history Crimea has 
undergone dramatic demographic changes, where it through a very long period of 
time has belonged to Russia or the Soviet Union, before it, in 1954, was given to 
Ukraine as a symbolic gesture. This gesture seemed insignificant at the time, because 
both Russia and Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union. But when the Soviet Union 
dissolute in December 1991, Russia had suddenly let go of a tactical territory.  
And in 1994 Russia and Ukraine came to an agreement, the Budapest Memorandum, 
which stipulated that Russia would pledge to uphold the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, and thereby recognize that Crimea was a part of Ukraine (link 7). 
 
Throughout the crisis, the EU have been, in one way or another, involved. Already 
before the great demonstration in Kiev, the Council of the European Union held a 
meeting where they agreed on readiness to a quick reaction, if the situation on the 
ground, in Ukraine, deteriorate. So when the protests in Ukraine against Viktor 
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Yanukovych escalated in Kiev on February 20th 2014, ending up with a tragedy with 
around 90 people being killed.  
As a reaction, the EU held an extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting, because 
of the worsened situation. The EU Council then decides to introduce targeted 
sanctions in terms of visa ban and a freezing of assets towards the people responsible 
for the violations of human rights. Furthermore the Ministers agreed on suspending 
export licenses on equipment which can be used for internal repression (EU External 
action, Fact Sheet, EU-Ukraine relations, 14 May 2014, p. 2). 
 
And as mentioned earlier; as the aftermath to these riots, Russia started their 
expedition into Ukraine, where they seized key buildings in the Crimean capital, 
Simferopol. This was definitely not a deterioration of the disturbances happening in 
Ukraine at the time, so the Council had to summon a second extraordinary meeting, 
concerning this Russian acquisition of Crimea. Through dialogue EU calls Russia to 
withdraw their forces from Ukrainian territory, but without positive response from 
Russia. 
As this internal crisis in Ukraine escalated to an international affair where Russia has 
violated several international laws, then EU held yet another meeting at March 5th, 
where they declare their sanctions targeting 18 persons whose visa has been banned 
and their assets has been banned within the EU. And as a due to this, the Head of 
State and Governments, on March 6th, makes a statement that a solution must be 
found through negotiations between the governments of Ukraine and Russia, 
including potential multilateral mechanisms. EU also suspends Russia from bilateral 
talks on visa matters and on the new EU-Russia agreement, and Russia is being 
suspended from the G8. Furthermore, the EU is preparing further measures if de-
escalatory steps do not occur (EU External action, Fact Sheet, EU-Ukraine relations, 
14 May 2014, p. 3). 
 
On March 16th Russia held a referendum in Crimea on whether or not the area should 
be declared as Russian territory, at first it was announced that 97% of the voters 
backed the proposal to join Russia, but later on this referendum was disputed, as 
leaked documents showed that the actual percentage was around 50-60% in favor of 
joining (Link 8). EU responded though to these actions, and as the hoped de-
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escalatory steps neither happened, EU adopted restrictive measures against the 
persons responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as persons and entities associated 
with them. To this, 21 persons was identified with a travel ban and a freeze of their 
assets within the EU, and 12 persons more were added to these sanctions. 
Furthermore the EU did not recognize Russia's illegal referendum (EU External 
action, Fact Sheet, EU-Ukraine relations, 14 May 2014, p. 3). 
After the referendums on Russia's annexation in the Crimean area, the Ukrainian 
troops withdrew, and reports show that a large number of Russian troops gathered 
outside the Crimean border, in the eastern part of Ukraine. This resulted in an 
occupation, by anti-Russian protesters, of government buildings in cities in the eastern 
part of Ukraine. 
On April 14th the list over persons being sanctioned by the EU expanded, once again. 
And the EU called Russia to repudiate lawless acts in eastern Ukraine and pull back 
the troops from the Ukrainian border. 
However on April 17th the EU, Russia, Ukraine and United states held a meeting in 
Geneva, where they came to an agreement to de-escalate the crisis, quickly. Though 
the agreement was broken by Russia, as Putin did not acknowledge this agreement as 
adequate. 
 
After these events the list of sanctioned persons have only expanded, and has reached 
a number of 61 different officials. And the negotiations on the Crimean crisis is 
ongoing.  
 
6.2. EU-Russia Relations  
 
Russia is considered a strategic partner of the EU (T. Renard, 2011, p. 3).  The EU is 
by far Russia’s biggest trading partner. In 2013 the EU accounted for 41,9% of 
Russian import and 52,9% of Russian export measured in trade flows of total goods. 
This is an enormous share especially compared to Russia’s second largest trading 
partner who by contrast only accounts for 16,3% of Russian import and 6,8% of 
Russian export (Directorate-General for Trade, 2013, p.9; C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 
2006, p. ). Where Russia’s dependency on EU import is more widely diffused in 
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primarily the HS sectors of machinery, appliances, transport equipment and chemical 
products, EU’s dependency on Russian import is highly concentrated in mineral 
products which accounts for 78,3% of total imports (Directorate-General for Trade, 
2013, p. 7). The scarce geographic distribution of oil as a resource, and other sources 
of oil as the Middle East has proven too unstable, it has made it a geopolitical tool for 
Russia and has shaped EU policy towards Russia for a long time (J. Hughes, 2007, p. 
86). In the policy area of EU strategic partners it is furthermore made very clear that 
trade and energy relations form a key cornerstone in the EU-Russia relationship 
(Directorate-General for External Relations, 2009, p. 152).  Even though there exists a 
debate surrounding the extent to which the relationship with Russia is truly strategic, 
the energy sector is without a doubt of particular relevance to the bilateral relationship 
and this dependency is simply too big to ignore. The relationship is in this connection 
highly strategic (T. Renard, 2011, p. 21, 39). Concerning the ENP it is therefore very 
important that a development of a mutually satisfactory relationship Russia 
continuous to exist. Even wider cooperation was strengthened with the creation of a 
Permanent Partnership Council in 2003 which set up the development of four 
“common spaces”, hereunder an economic space including energy and aspired for a a 
Russian integration including “everything but the institution”. (C. Bretherton & J. 
Vogler, 2006, p. 151) Progress and the EU-Russia relationship has though been 
criticized as being “high on rhetoric and light on substance – wide but thin” (D. 
Lynch, 2004, p. 36).  
 
6.3. EU - Ukraine historic political relations 
 
The relations between the EU and Ukraine are currently on the grounds of the 
Partnership and Co-operation agreement (PCA), this entered into force in 1998. Later 
on - at the Paris Summit in 2008 - the leaders of the European Union and Ukraine 
came to an agreement that an Association Agreement should be the replacement to the 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. 
The Association Agreement between EU and Ukraine is the first of these new 
generations of agreements with Eastern Partnership countries, and therefor Ukraine 
can be noted as possessing one of the closest relation between a neighboring country 
and the EU (Link 3). 
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According to the European Union, the Association Agreement is a stage in the 
development of the EU-Ukraine relations, with the goal of a political association and 
economic integration, and with a contract on these parameters it can lead to further 
progressive developments between the EU and Ukraine (Link 3)  
So the processes and institutions are in operation, although the process is slow in the 
implementations, it is happening. But despite all of these processes, there is a severe 
conflict of interest in terms of the eagerness of Ukraine as a member state of the 
European Union.  
Ukraine has had a full EU membership as a central political goal since 1998, and this 
is strengthened through the awareness that a Ukrainian neighbor state - Poland - has 
had a preferential treatment since they were recognized with a candidate status. But 
from EU's perspective, the potential "strategic partnership" status of Ukraine has been 
muted, and Ukraine has been treated equally with all of the other new independent 
states of the former Soviet Union (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, 153). 
So through the history of the EU and Ukraine, the EU has been offering Ukraine the 
'carrot' in terms of constantly keeping the doors open for new and further integration, 
but without at any point offering a membership. But still, through the partially 
integrating policies, leaving Ukraine with the impression that a membership is 
achievable on a long-term. 
 
6.4. European Neighborhood Policy 
 
The European Neighborhood policy is a bilateral relationship between the European 
Union and each of the different partner countries. It is furthermore complimented by 
regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives, such as the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, the Eastern Partnership et cetera. These partnerships and policies is 
functioning as an extended unification of gathering the countries just outside the 
European Union within the same banner as the member states, but without the 
interdependence that exists, if the neighbor countries is to join the European Union.  
The relationships are build on the basis that it the EU should, via the neighborhood 
policy, be able to point the neighboring countries in the right direction, in terms of 
promoting deep and sustainable democracy, common values and economic 
development (Link 4). The Commission addressed in 2003 the union capacity to 
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provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be 
distinguishable from its interests in close cooperation with the neighbors 
(Commission, 2003, 104:3).  
ENP is about regional relations and cooperation, which means that the policy is about 
sharing knowledge and principles with neighboring countries, which are not 
recognized as candidates, and thereby strengthen stability, security and welfare for all 
countries in the region. The European neighborhood policy also gives the neighboring 
countries access to several EU activities in the quest of increasing cooperation on 
political, economic and cultural matters (Link 5) 
The neighborhood policy ensures close and cordial relations in the region in and 
around the European Union. And it is partly through these relations that the collective 
identity of the European Union is constructed (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 
137). 
         
7. EU global actorness as a normative power in Ukraine – A gap between 
expectations and capabilities? 
 
With this analysis we will, from the starting point of Bretherton & Vogler’s actorness 
approach examine what internal and external factors have permitted, promoted or 
constrained the development of EU’s role in the Ukraine Conflict (C. Bretherton & J. 
Vogler, 2006, p. 13). The external factors, expectations and actions, of third parties, 
do from our constructivist approach contribute to the shaping of understanding, policy 
environment and the relations between EU and third countries (C. Bretherton & J. 
Vogler, 2006, p. 13). We will therefore have a focus on the interconnected 
relationship between agency and structure – capabilities and expectations.  
 
7.1 The construction of expectations 
 
On this ground our analysis will thus begin by investigating the EU’s own creation of 
external expectations. We take the view that presence to some degree shapes external 
expectations. The conflicts where the outcome has been directed by the EU creates 
external understandings and demands for the EU to act accordingly in a similar 
situation (C. Hill, 1993, p. 310). The EU itself thereby, in action or inaction contribute 
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to the discursive practice of creating the common identity of the EU. C. Hill and other 
affiliated authors, as N. Tocci, A. Toje and R. Ginsberg draws on history, and 
previous EU actions in a global environment to build the understanding of both 
capabilities and this case most importantly expectations. (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 
2006, p. 24; A. Toje, 2008, p. 125-128; R. Ginsberg, 1999, p. 6-7; N. Tocci, 2011, 
p.5). It is therefore logical for us to assume that the historical context of the EU is 
important for its contemporary expectations. Conflict resolution missions has been 
conducted in e.g. Afghanistan, the African Great Lakes Region, Bosnia, Central Asia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus, Somalia, Congo, 
Sudan and the Balkans (N. Tocci, 2011, p. 5). An enhanced CFSP and international 
activity pressures internally for more activity and decisiveness and externally 
expectations rise accordingly (C. Hill, 1993, p. 20). International activity towards 
cases on violation of EU principles and norms has established the EU as a normative 
power and the EU thus acts to set world standards in normative terms. This means that 
EU identity and thereby also its expectations are partly constructed through how its 
foreign policy is conducted and the impacts and understandings it leaves. (R. 
Rosecrance, 1998, p. 22). The normative argument for the whole policy of ENP is that 
the relationship should be based on and take into account the extend to which values 
are shared between the EU and its neighbors (C. Gebhard, 2007, p. 9). As mentioned 
in the background the conflict is very grounded in differing feelings of 
national/cultural belonging. This aspect of the ENP is therefore important to 
understand the reason for EU involvement.  
 
Of course not all of the before mentioned foreign policy activities can be directly 
paralleled to the Ukraine conflict but a number of reasons encourage us to construct 
external expectations of the EU on this behalf, but also factors which limits the 
expectations. This does not only account for actions but also statements and 
declarations, and will be elaborated below. 
 
First, it can be argued that the case of Ukraine is not essentially much different from 
previous situations in which the EU has engaged in conflict resolution. The EU has 
made human rights and preservation of international law a central aspect of its 
external action service and many of its previous missions e.g. former Yugoslavia and 
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the Middle East, has been related to some degree of human rights violations (C. 
Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 13). According to United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 
violations has occurred as follows: unlawful detentions and killings, deprivation of 
liberty including torture and further violation of the rule of law, freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly and political rights. The relatively high death tolls 
under the protests of over 100 would furthermore regard the situation as a serious 
security concern (UNHCHRR Report, 2014, p. 3-20). The ENP’s commitment to 
conflict prevention and crisis management in its neighboring, furthermore reinforces 
external expectations of the EU (C. Gebhard, 2007, p. 5). 
 
Second, the more general aspirations of the EU’s foreign policy aspirations constructs 
an actor identity that obliges the EU to uphold its own values not just internally but 
also beyond its bordes. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 outlines a link between its internal 
nature and external projection when it declares external action aims at “preserving 
peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security” (Treaty of 
Lisbon, 2009, article III, 193, 2c). The projection of internal policies is also important 
for Hill who underlines that the incentives, which the EU can project in conflict 
resolution policies, are “embedded in its internal institutional, legal and policy 
framework” (C. Hill, 2001, p. 315-322). It is thereby commonly understood that the 
EU is very strong on principles and norms, and has big aspirations for these principles 
and norms to include protection of human rights in its relations with the wider world 
(the Treaty of the European Union, TEU, 1993). We strongly argue that the EU itself 
has established itself as a normative global actor through its treaties, policies and 
actions and on that ground established expectations for it to act accordingly in 
international conflict, which we have argued, the Ukrainian case is.  
 
Third, more specifically the EU has reasons to maintain the security of the EU and the 
region of Europe by extension of its own stability, prosperity and values. It is 
therefore in EU’s own interest that the countries on its borders are well-governed (E. 
Tulmets, 2007, p. 202; C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 190; Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, p. 5-6). External conflicts, 
like the Ukraine crisis is a concern as security is a precondition of development 
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policies and economic activity with neighboring countries. Conflict destroys 
infrastructure, including social infrastructure, encourages criminality, deters 
investment and makes normal economic activity impossible (European Security 
Strategy, 2003, p. 2). Furthermore the specific diplomatic relationship with Ukraine is 
on a related note to EU’s declared principles based on respect for common values and 
an acknowledgment the European aspirations of Ukraine (European Union External 
Action Ukraine Factsheet, 2012, p.1). The before mentioned neighborhood policy is 
ensuring close and cordial relations in the region in and around the EU and it is 
through these relations that the collective identity of the EU will be constructed. Thus, 
through its policies with Ukraine the EU has by its interaction constructed ideas about 
its actorness. (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 137). 
 
We will on this ground argue that the EU has through previous and ongoing direct 
conflict resolutions, declarations of principles and norms and its relationship with 
Ukraine constructed an image of its global actorness that would oblige it to act 
according to its capabilities in a conflict so near its own borders. Through this 
evidence we have also shown how the EU is by its own contributing to both the 
internal and external expectations and thereby the perceived identity of EU as a global 
actor. This leads us to further investigate this area of actorness by examining the 
normative aspect of expectations – how the deciding of what is normal has led to 
expectations of EU upholding its principles. This will in connection to the previous 
examples focus on the EU conflict resolution in Crimea and how the normative nature 
of the EU has build expectations to this case.  
 
7.2. Normative aspects of conflict resolution 
 
While conflict resolution can take many forms, EU has though always favored soft 
power approaches (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 190). Most importantly these 
can include both economic aid and humanitarian aid in the form of civilian 
peacekeeping tasks (J. Solana, 2003, p. 17). We will start by focusing on the latter 
followed by the aspect of diplomacy and economic capabilities. 
 
At the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 2003 it was reinforced, in its 
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own rhetoric, that the EU were now capable of conducting some crisis-management 
operation. This included full operational capability across the Peterberg tasks 
(European Union External Action - CSDP, 2011, p. 2). It does from the Treaty of 
Lisbon include humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping 
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, joint 
disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and finally post-conflict 
stabilization tasks (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, article 42). It was furthermore 
envisioned that by 2010 the EU should be able to execute crisis management 
operations covered by the TEU, which explicitly states that in its relations with the 
wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and contribute to the 
protection of its citizens and observe international law (The Treaty on European 
Union, TEU, 1993, article 3).  There are though shortfalls in the EU’s current 
capability of civilian and military operations. There exist issues by way of 
deployment, communication, military pooling and policy coherence (European Union 
External Action - CSDP, 2011, p. 5; C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 32). The 
expectations of both EU citizens and neighborhood countries have in a poll from the 
commissions been formulated as expectations for a greater international presence. 
There is strong public support for EU action to meet global challenges and conflicts 
by suitable means (B. Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, p. 2). The need for policies to be 
processed at a more supranational level, including further sharing and pooling of 
military and higher cooperative measures between member states is furthermore made 
clear by the council. The main argument is that the EU would provide expertise in 
areas such as interoperability and standardization of operations (3091st Foreign 
Affairs Council meeting, 2001, p. 1-2). We will, from the before mentioned set of 
expectations, consequently strongly underline the importance of the capability of 
coherence. The treaties and EU official declarations are from a constructivist point of 
view the very result of member state interaction and construction of a set of European 
principles and normative basis on which we all, as the member states can reach 
consensus (I. Manners, 2002, p. 242). The EU’s constitutional norms hence represent 
crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity (C. Gebhard, 2007, p. 
13; I. Manners, 2002, p. 241). The EU does though only possess an amount of 
normative power globally equal to the sum of the ideas that we attribute to its 
international identity. It is our collective normative beliefs, which shape the identity 
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and role of the EU, and as we also argue, the EU is strongest on the policies where 
coherence and agreement can be met and thereby where it can speak with one voice. 
Principles and the standardization of the normal is inherent to the very nature of the 
EU and creates a certain legitimacy when collective statements is made. This does 
however also create expectations of the same amount of coherence when rhetoric 
becomes reality. In this context, EU has displayed flaws similarly inherent in its 
nature as “an association of states reluctant and unable to share sovereignty and act in 
unison in international affairs (N. Tocci, 2011, p. 4)”. The EU has previously failed to 
demonstrate unity and availability of policy instruments in e.g. Kuwait, Yugoslavia 
and the Balkans (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 166). These previous 
interactions we will argue has deconstructed what the EU itself had established as its 
fundamental capabilities. We might then argue that expectations towards military and 
civilian power activities might have been internally high but externally low due to 
previous failures and structural inefficiency (N. Tocci, 2011, p. 11). There are clearly 
some internal factors constraining the capability of conflict resolution that exists in 
the institutional setting of the EU (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 163). These 
might equally lower expectations of EU involvement in conflict resolution in Crimea 
but also display a lack of what hill termed the capability of ”coherence”. Coherence 
does in our actorness framework indicate both the ability to reach a collective 
decision but also very importantly policy coherence and implications of the absence 
of it. We will elaborate on this below. 
 
7.3. The institutional and structural problem to actorness expectations 
 
We argue that despite the normative goals and principles of the EU and the global 
expectations resulting here from, a common understanding of the EU’s institutional 
and structural limits in CEG’s capability “to reach and implement a collective 
decision” contributes to lowering those expectations. The critique is found in the 
recurring inability to reach consensus in foreign policy votings between member 
states and hereunder the unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty in the EU foreign 
policy realm (N. Tocci, 2011, p. 11). Especially member state cooperation on high 
politics are in many cases deficient to provide a fully effective foreign policy (C. 
Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 163). The lack of understanding are grounded both in 
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everyday practice, but also in cross-pillar issues, which in our case would involve 
economic sanctions and collective civilian action (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 
176). Cross-pillar tension can be perceived as a failure to construct common 
understandings and coherence – an inability to construct a common approach to 
conflict resolution due to conflicting national foreign policy approaches (C. 
Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 174). The Commission has established conflict 
resolution responsibilities for the EU, but concerning the ENP it is similarly an 
example of the implications of cross-pillar cooperation. The responsibilities of the 
Commission is challenged by the ENP’s links to economic development with security 
concerns, cross-border crime, democratization and human rights” (C. Bretherton & J. 
Vogler, 2006, p. 176) These policy areas requires a high degree of political 
cooperation between member states in order to establish clear aims and objectives in 
the Ukrainian conflict. The aims are however only achievable if functioning links 
exists between the making of policy and implementation. (C. Gebhard, 2007, p. 5; C. 
Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 177). We will then argue that while the EU is heavy 
on rhetoric concerning the promotion of its norms and principles and these serves as 
acculturating and stabilizing to some extent, we might not expect full deployment of 
its available capabilities due to institutional and structural obstacles like member state 
sovereignty and inability to reach collective decisions. Security-wise the EU has as 
mentioned in our section on ”EU-Russia relations” developed a strong 
interdependence with Russia. Any external action, which might complicate this 
bilateral relationship, would create a high degree of indecisiveness among the 
Member States. Apart from the EU’s recurring institutional incohesiveness in 
upholding its principles through civilian instruments, we will below furthermore 
argue that the structural problem of the ENP might also lower expectations of EU 
actorness.   
 
The policies self-proclaimed objectives are high in both normative and physical terms. 
We support the belief of Carmen Gebhard when she states that the ENP is functioning 
as a showcase for EU’s foreign political actorness (C. Gebhard, 2007, p. 3) It is 
therefore important if the EU wants to act as a global power that at least its self-
declared policies with its neighboring countries are coherent. Gebhard introduces the 
concept of ”suitability” describing  their degree of appropriateness to the social 
circumstances (C. Gebhard, 2007, p. 5) . Bretherton & Vogler argues that the 
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determinant or opportunity defines the external environment of ideas and events 
which constrains or enable actorness (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 177). An 
important constraint in relation to the Crimea conflict is the involvement of its 
strategic partner Russia. Full execution of the EU’s responsibilities expressed in the 
ENP might be complicated for instrumental reasons (A. Moravcsik, 1999, p. 671). 
The social circumstances of instrumental reason for the ENP to be appropriate could 
in this case be that the conduction of the policy would not ”generate appropriate 
outcomes”  (C. Gebhard, 2007, p. 5). As we mentioned earlier, EU’s relation with 
Russia results in an environment in which EU actorness is constrained for 
instrumental reasons. Thus, coercive action towards Russia might signal a threat to the 
interdependence shared between the two parties. The annexation of Crimea though 
creates a strong incentive to reevaluate the proclaimed opportunity for enlargement to 
the EU thus avoiding new dividing lines in Europe and promote stability (European 
Council, 2002, pt. 22-23). This raises expectations for EU actorness. As we have 
presented, the complexity of both the context of the conflict and the 
institutional/structural setting of the EU does complicate its opportunity and 
capabilities. Nonetheless, despite the constrain in structural operational framework, an 
absence of presence according to its normative ENP principles would from our CEG 
approach construct a gap between the external and internal expectations of ENP 
actorness and declared capabilities. 
 
We have demonstrated which internal constraints in the construction of coherent 
foreign policy that might influence EU actorness in Crimea. The EU is a complex 
actor consisting of 28 different member states with different interests and ideas 
frequently as we have stated resulting in CFSP incoherence. The EU is though also, as 
argued by Ian Manners an entity that shares a set of norms and principles, which are 
best diffused through the promotion of the EU’s principles in engagement and 
dialogue (I. Manners, 2009, p.3; I. Manners, 2002, p. 244-245). Those are very 
important aspects of the EU’s normative power and leads us to evaluate its diplomatic 
engagement in Ukraine.  
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7.4. EU Diplomacy in Ukraine 
Shared understandings about the essential nature of the EU is both embedded in its 
external policies, which we argue are sometimes very ambitious, but also in its direct 
actorness as a “peace project” (N. Tocci, 2011, p. 2; C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, 
p. 38-39). Concerning EU presence From Bretherton & Voglers framework, 
diplomacy serves as a way to exert influence beyond the EU’s borders and shape the 
behavior of others, which we strongly underline is an important conflict resolution 
tool (Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 27). We argue that the EU should be expected 
to act as a mediator between the two conflicting parties of Russia and Ukraine. We 
base this on EU’s historic preference to solve conflicts through dialogue and general 
”soft power” initiatives (E. Tulmets, 2007, p. 202-206; A. Ciambra, 2008, p. 10). ”soft 
power” or the diplomatic capability not only de-emphasizes, but does also not 
exclude, the expectations of the EU to utilize coercive means as military intervention 
or economic sanctions, but also raise expectations for the EU to rely on the power of 
attraction and persuasion (E. Tulmets, 2007, p. 202; J. Nye, 2004, p. 256). From our 
findings, it is clear that the EU is strongest and most credible when it is able to speak 
with one voice. Diplomatic efforts are thereby heavily reliant on specific and coherent 
measures or initiatives that reinforces the EU’s collective norms and principles, 
stemming from institutions dedicated to externally represent the EU (C. Bretherton & 
J. Vogler, 2006, p. 187). There has historically been success in diplomatic conflict 
negotiating with third countries, inter alia in relation to negotiating the 2001 Ohrid 
Framework agreement that ended armed conflict in Macedonia, and the 2002 
Belgrade Agreement that provided for new constitutional arrangements between 
Serbia and Montenegro. Furthermore, the former chief of EU foreign policy Javier 
Solana played an important role in defusing the crisis that occurred in the aftermath of 
the flawed presidential elections in Ukraine 2004 (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, p. 179). 
These successful diplomatic solutions carried out by EU officials, we argue, has 
contributed to increased external and internal expectations in relation to the EU’s 
diplomatic conflict management. 
 
President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barosso has through diplomatic 
relations with Ukraine and Russia been a central mediator acting to establish political 
dialogue (European Commission, 2014). Both on April 17th and may 21th  he officially 
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sent and published letters directly to Russian president Vladimir Putin emphasizing 
the previously mentioned maintenance of mutual interdependence and encouraged 
him to engage in a trilateral dialogue between all parties involved respectively, 
Ukraine, EU and Russia (J. Barroso, 2014). Most importantly, we wish to underline 
the importance of the letters setting. It is explicitly written on behalf of the European 
Union and its 28 Member States. This creates a channel through which the EU can 
coherently express its standpoint. Also in the multilateral framework of the G7 the EU 
has expressed its condemnation of the Russian annexation and the Crimean 
referendum, which it deems to have no legal affect, according to the UN Charter (The 
European Commission, 2014). Most diplomatic dialogues contain a strong focus on 
the rule of law, human rights and respect of territorial sovereignty. We would argue 
that high expectations, if not obligations, have been present for EU and ‘forcefully’ 
encouraged diplomats to propose diplomatic solutions to the crisis and engage in 
dialogue. It is an area in which EU has a strong capability and are expected to act, but 
also have the opportunity to speak with one voice and, as we have argued, thereby 
exert strong influence in normative terms. From our point of view, with certain 
emphasis on EU as a normative power, there has, opposed to the areas of conflict 
resolution, not been a remarkable gap between the diplomatic capabilities of the EU 
and the related expectations to this instrument. This is not to say that diplomacy in 
this context would demonstrate a significant presence of the EU and in that sense 
provide a solution.  
 
It is clear that the EU is constructing itself and its identity through its collective 
approach to foreign policy and thereby, if it sticks to its principles, reasserts itself as a 
normative power (I. Manners, 2002, p. 241). Returning to Hill’s CEG, no matter the 
expectations of diplomacy the EU might possess capabilities in other areas that would 
exert stronger appropriateness to the conflict context. This leads to examine the EU as 
a great economic power and the strong ideas attributed to the use of economy as an 
instrument. 
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7.5. The availability of economic instruments 
 
A major part of the EU’s attractiveness stems from its economic strength and the 
prospect of financial prosperity. We will briefly examine how previous actions of the 
EU have contributed to a raise in the external expectations of its economic 
capabilities.  
 
With the launch of the ‘Instrument for Stability’ program in 2007 and the 
mobilization of EUR 286 million funds dedicated to IfS in 2012 alone, the European 
Commission, and thus the EU committed itself to pursue conflict prevention, crisis 
management and peace building worldwide through substantial economic funding 
(European Union External Action, 2014).  With emerging and current actions in over 
50 countries, the EU has been using the IfS to respond rapidly in many unfolding 
events around the world  e.g. In response to the Syrian crisis where a substantial 
regional support program was provided in order to help the Syrian population and the 
surrounding countries (European Commission 2013). The EU has also provided 
economic assistance in Asia providing the opportunity to set up a Peace Centre in 
Burma, which serves as an important instance in the countries evolving peace process. 
In addition to the launch of the IfS program the EU has an external relations budget 
with the overall objective of ensuring that the EU is also able to fulfill its ambitions of 
diversifying its core values, democracy, peace, solidarity, stability and poverty 
reduction (European Commission 2013).         
     
As we have argued several times throughout this analysis, the EU does not only 
construct itself through current interaction. The historical context in which it is 
embedded plays a large role in how the EU has been constructed as an actor (I. 
Manners, 2002: 240). Thus, from an external perspective history might have created 
expectations that forces the EU to act when one or more of its core principles such as 
international law and human rights are clearly breached as it is evident with the recent 
Russian annexation of Crimea and the following disturbances within Ukraine. The EU 
has a specific focus on securing the well-being of its neighboring nations 
economically and security-wise by answering their expectations with the presence of 
plausible economic solutions among other measures (E. Tulmets, 2007, p. 202; C. 
Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 190).  
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The financial means mobilized in order to answer the neighbors’ expectations are 
arguably not sufficient. The European Council did in 2003 agree to provide 12 billion 
Euro that are to be shared among 17 countries including Russia for a period of seven 
years. In the aftermath of this decision, European officials explained that the real 
challenge lies in managing the expectations of the partner countries, and clarify that 
the aiding funds are limited but the will to cooperate is not (E. Tulmets, 2007, p. 208).  
The EU’s general economic support of partner countries, leaves the impression that 
the EU in times of crisis like the current in Ukraine, will structure economic packages 
devised to e.g. reconstruction or plain economic aid.  
The aspect of economic aid is just one side of the coin in relation to the EU’s 
economic power. Based on its strong economy the EU is also known as being capable 
of regulating partner countries behavior through economic sanctions (hard power) 
despite the contradictions to its reputation as a normative power.  
            
We argue that economic sanctions are of rare use by the EU, and the threat of 
sanctions is often sufficient in order to regulate certain behavior. Furthermore, we 
argue that the sanctions against Russia in the current crisis, as an economic instrument 
does not correlate with its usual foreign normative policies. However it can also be 
argued that in a conflict situation, economic sanctions might be an instrument to 
strengthen its normative power and acculturating effect externally. It can be argued 
that in order best exert its presence, the economic power of the EU can act as an 
instrument to legitimize its sense and expectations of collective political purpose 
beyond its borders (C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, 2006, p. 190).  
 
From our point of view there has been a challenge to the common perception of EU 
normative actorness since it has been exercised differently and the use of hard power 
e.g. economic sanctions of Russia without achieving the desired result should be seen 
as a blow to its identity in international politics. Thus, we believe that there has been 
quite the gap between the EU’s economic capabilities and the external expectations, 
which would have required sufficient measures in order to secure the conflict area.    
The EU will aim for donor-recipient mutual accountability in allocating and 
disbursing funds. Overall, EU external instruments will take greater account of human 
rights, democracy and good governance when it comes to allocating external 
assistance to partner countries (European Commission, 2013). 
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8. A Reflection of EU Actorness  
 
Through the previous analytical/theoretical section we have employed our theoretical 
foundation to conceptualize the gap between EU’s capabilities and expectations in 
Crimea as a normative by examining various policy areas. This section aims to dissect 
the power of norms by critically discussing EU as a normative actor and how this, as 
outlined in the problem formulation, contributes to widen the gap between capabilities 
and expectations. This will take its starting point in how intergovernmentalism, even 
though constructing a European identity through the accumulation of ideas, also 
hinders the EU’s normative power. This leads to a reflection on the very dilemma of 
normative power, discussing to what extend soft power is enough to exert influence in 
a context of conflict. Following, on the same notion of limits, we will review if the 
limits of the ENP and how stronger artillery as the prospect of membership might 
influence. Finally this will lead us to present the flaws we have revealed in our 
research and present our hypothetical policy suggestions.  
8.1. In varietate concordia – United in diversity? 
 
We very early reached the preliminary conclusion that the EU complexity of 28 
member states with different interests and ideas frequently would result in CFSP 
incoherence. The legal foundation is though as argued based on member state 
interaction and construction of common principles and norms, which embraces 
diversity and dialogue represented in the Union’s motto: ”In varietate concordia – 
United in diversity (G. F. Simons & A. Bos, 2002, p. 110)”. The diversity though also 
creates intergovernmental problems under foreign policy voting where decisions can 
be hard to reach on unanimity. This does, apart from where responsibility of 
representation is delegated to an authority as the Commission or e.g. J. Barroso, 
Complicate collective action and the ability to exert common values coherently. It is 
very important for us to emphasize the importance of common values being promoted 
through common action. Member states acting unilaterally or independent of EU will 
contribute to a normative deficit as it clearly demonstrates either a dispersion of those 
values that should be common or a big difference in the degree to which the 
individual member states prioritize the promotion of these. We argued that the 
institutional setting was an obstacle for common conflict resolution in Crimea, and we 
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hold that belief. From a constructivist approach it can however also be argued that, as 
ideas are fluid and subject to historical change, so is the concept of normative power. 
The idea of normative power are as we claimed only equal to the sum of the ideas that 
is attributed to it. The lack of action to uphold the EU’s values would then from our 
point of view not necessarily dissolve the EU as a normative power but rather, 
reconstruct the ideas contributed to its norms. This is though not to say that it would 
be without consequences. From the contribution of Hill we have seen how 
expectations matter, and how expectations influence the priority of the EU’s 
capacities. For example, by historical success in diplomatic solutions to international 
conflict, internal as well as external expectations has grown towards the effects of that 
instrument. A reprioritizing of EU’s instruments would result in a loss of legitimacy. 
We argued for this on the ground of how normative power is only valuable when it 
can be used to influence or acculturate in the favor of EU and the recipient. 
Expectations to EU as a normative power would thereby, from our point of view 
decline if soft power instruments ceases to have an effect when utilized, which we 
argue has been the case in Crimea. Considering the intergovernmentalist decision-
making it is though hard to consider “hard power” as a common tool (C. Bretherton & 
J. Vogler, 2006, p. 163). We would however not argue that “soft power” has failed in 
any way. Rather it is worth considering how the number one persuasive instrument at 
hand for the EU could be utilized to embrace those countries that do share EU’s 
norms and principles and wishes to engage in close cooperation. That leads ud to 
discuss the European Neighborhood policy and its limits. 
 
8.2. ENP/Enlargement 
 
We will now engage in a discussion about whether the introduction of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 is a sufficient tool for securing a stable and 
friendly European backyard or if the EU should consider making further 
enlargements.   
 
It is apparent from our research findings that one of the major efforts embedded 
within the EU foreign policy is to diffuse its core principles and norms e.g. 
democracy, human rights, international law and good governance while securing 
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stability and economic prosperity within and around the European member-states. The 
introduction of the ENP serves as an instrument to achieve this effort.  
Some critics argue that due to the asymmetrical relations stemming from the diffusion 
of the ENP certain countries have grown to be very close economic partners with the 
EU and thus highly dependent on its decision - making. They argue that such a 
dependency qualify as a form of empire or hegemonic state with neighboring 
countries becoming the EU’s periphery (E. Tulmets, 2007, p. 196). 
The prospect of enlargement and accession to the EU is arguably the main reason and 
argument for third countries to adapt its policies and norms to the ones of the EU and 
strive towards obtaining the conditionalities required. From our research, we came to 
the conclusion that Ukraine is generally motivated by closer ties to the EU, 
particularly since they have expressed the will to become a candidate country, but are 
currently only offered the benefits of ENP (E. Tulmets, 2007, p. 205).  
Additionally results of the enlargement policy have shown that the adoption of the EU 
norms was facilitated by the incentive of accession and the political will of the third 
countries. We believe that without the perspective of accession, the only remaining 
option for the EU is to be attractive enough so that third states like the Ukraine 
comply with its norms and take recommendations seriously.  
EU officials nonetheless tend to argue that the ENP initiative is one of the most 
successful and sustainable measures expressed in the history of European foreign 
policy. Romano Prodi former president of the European Commission, argues that 
even though the goal of accession is the most powerful stimulus for third countries to 
cooperate, a less ambitious goal of partnership through ENP should have positive and 
beneficial effects for the partners involved (European Commission, 2002). Benita 
Ferrero Waldner the former European Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighborhood Policy elaborates on this belief by stating that the EU should 
be using all means at their disposal to persuade emerging third powers to sign up for 
the ENP initiative, in order to preserve an international order based on the values 
dearest to the EU (The European Commission, 2006)    
 
We believe that the best way to ensure cooperation and security while diffusing the 
core principles of the EU through conditionalities as reflected in the ENP agreements 
is with the incentive of accession. Without this incentive, the EU’s attractiveness loses 
legitimacy and interest for third countries. Furthermore, we believe that there is a 
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difficult task in redefining its relationship with a major strategic partner, Russia, who 
refused to be part of the ENP. The EU and Russia energy – relations are defined by a 
great deal of interdependence, and the current crisis in Ukraine has exhibited great 
limitations in the European normative actorness since there seems to be no applicable 
or suitable solutions, when the nation in question tends not to care about the execution 
of economic sanctions or express much interest in negotiations (The European 
Commission, 2006).   
 
When we consider the latest actions by pro – Russian activists in eastern Ukraine and 
in Crimea, we can’t help but wonder if we could have experienced a different and 
improved outcome if Ukraine have been presented with the possible prospect of 
enlargement and accession into the EU. The pro – Russian activists may have 
reconsidered their affiliation if they have had the prospect of accession. Concluding, 
we thus believe that if the EU had promised the Ukraine the prospect of enlargement 
in the aftermath of the election crisis in 2004, instead of just being an economic 
partner through the instrument of ENP, the current crisis might have been of a 
different nature.  
 
8.3. Normative power implications 
 
The EU's normative power, has through this paper been analyzed, and the 
expectations, in terms of conflict resolutions, to the EU is great, because of their 
historical success in situations that are partially similar to the Crimean crisis. But 
when EU is facing a regular hard power as Russia and their leader, Vladimir Putin, 
the normative power can be met by its own limits. - If the opposing part do not seek 
the capabilities of the EU's normative power, or do not fear the sanctions that the EU 
are, or will be, executing. 
 
Ian Manners stipulated that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the 
international system and that the EU acts to change norms in the international system, 
but he is of the believe that the EU should act to extend its norms into the 
international system (I. Manners, 2002, p. 252). According to this notion from Ian 
Manners, the EU is simply acting with the wrong approach. This could be helpful for 
the EU in terms of negotiating with Russia on, wether or not they can break 
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international laws and acquire Ukrainian territory by force. Or is the normative power, 
constructed by EU, simply not enough in terms of matters like this crisis on the 
Crimean peninsula. Through the analysis of the crisis, and EU's actorness during the 
crisis, one could argue that, the fact that EU primarily is a normative power, is a 
regular obstacle in terms of foreign policy - If they wish to control or manipulate what 
is going on in the neighboring countries located between the EU and Russia. 
 
If the EU is to, as Ian Manners noted, act to extend its norms in the international 
system, does the Normative Power Europe then have a lack of hard power to back up 
the extension of these norms? The Crimean crisis has until now shown that there are 
flaws, in terms of the EU has not been able to come to a sustainable agreement with 
Ukraine and Russia. Well aware that the crisis is still ongoing, then it is interesting to 
speculate on how the progress of the crisis would have been, if the EU was more a 
hard power, and fought the Russian invasion of Crimea, as the Russians did it 
themselves. This of course is not a probable scenario, as the EU is, more or less, only 
exercising normative and or soft power. But until this point, it has not been enough to 
influence Russia to make de-escalatory steps in Crimea. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Despite the relative age of both CEG (1993) and NPE (2002) we argue that they are 
still, if not more than ever, relevant to analyze EU global actorness. The EU has as a 
normative power prospered from the power of persuasion and idée-force, and grounds 
its foreign policy deeply in its common principles, ideas and norms. We thus argue 
that the historical conduction of foreign policy alongside the EU’s declarations of 
global and regional responsibility has shaped the expectations of EU actorness in the 
conflict of Ukraine. These has both been positive and demonstrated the EU’s presence 
and initiative to action which has heightened expectations for similar action in 
Crimea. On one hand this argument is reinforced the context of the conflict: 1) 
Ukraine is an important trade partner. 2) As a European country and EU 
neighborhood country it is important that it is well-governed and stabile.  3) Ukraine 
has shown dedication for EU accession, and prolonging/inaction may, as we might be 
witnessing, create incentive for Russian affiliation. 4) Failure to act according to 
capabilities upon clear breaches of international law will result in loss of legitimacy 
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and as we propose ”a questioning or revalidation of the capability of normative 
power”. 5) Failure to act according to capabilities will lower internal and external 
expectations of EU actorness and may result in further difficulty to reach and act on a 
collective foreign policy decision.  On the other hand we have also reached the 
conclusion that despite a clear inflation of capabilities, at least internal expectations 
arguably might not be very high. We conclude this from 1) The EU’s institutional and 
structural limits in CEG’s capability “to reach and implement a collective decision” 
on foreign policy matters. 2) Previous conflict resolution failures. 3) The EU’s strong 
interdependence with Russia and its clear incentive to preserve this.  
We have from our analysis concluded that according to its proclaimed capabilities 
lived up to expectations concerning its preference of soft power and dialogue through 
diplomacy. Furthermore, expectations, grounded in the EU’s strong economy, has to 
some extend been fulfilled. An aid to Ukraine has been initiated, the result of which 
we cannot conclude. It has however not, from our analysis fulfilled the expectations 
of conflict resolution through civilian means, which we argue has been constructed 
historically and most importantly through declarations. Finally, we argue that the 
capability of cohesiveness is the most central problem of EU actorness and presence 
in this conflict. We interpret the EU as a sui generis actor. We imply through our 
findings and our methodological approach that realist measurements of capabilities 
and actorness in quantitative terms cannot fully account for neither expectations nor 
capabilities. Rather we have in Hill’s framework found cohesiveness to be 
overarching and highly interrelated to the success of both the use and threat of force, 
diplomacy, economic instruments and cultural influence. Where responsibility of 
representation is delegated to an authority we strongly argue that the EU is an 
important global actor. But the aims of its foreign policy are however only achievable 
if functioning links exists between the making of policy and collective 
implementation, which we interpret as fair to conclude that there has not fully been.  
 
We can conclude that even though the ENP has achieved considerable success in 
securing stability and establishing tight economic relations with neighboring 
countries, we believe that proactive rounds of enlargement in the Eastern Europe 
previous to the crisis, would have changed the nature to which extent the events in 
Ukraine has unfolded. The milieu within and surrounding the Ukrainian and Crimean 
borders would undoubtedly have been more EU – friendly. We thus suggest that if the 
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EU pays more attention to countries with internal conflicting opinions and affiliations, 
such as it was present in parts of Ukraine, they may be able to prevent future domestic 
riots, which enhanced the circumstances for Russia to carry out the recent annexation 
of Crimea. If providing the prospect of accession may prevent or reduce the extent of 
violence in emerging domestic and international conflicts like the current one in 
Ukraine it might be worth considering. 
 
As a final conclusion, we argue that the EU has from an overall perspective acted 
according to its capabilities, but not according to the expectations associated 
therewith. A considerable gap has thereby been constructed under the conflict, mainly 
caused by high ambitions and institutional/structural incoherence. 
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